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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Katherine Lynn Arsenault 
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June 2016 
 
Title: In Lieu of Paper Tigers: An Analysis on the Biological Weapons Convention’s 
Negotiations and Suggestions of the Future 
 
 
The Biological Weapons Convention has been criticized for its lack of measures 
that prevent biological and toxin weapons from being used on civilians around the globe. 
The Biological Weapons Convention is the main international disarmament treaty that 
attempts to prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological and 
toxin weapons. In the 1990’s, the State Parties of this treaty entered into negotiations in an 
attempt to create mandates that would further prevent biological warfare, by focusing on 
facets of this treaty that are weak (Littlewood, 2012). From 1994 to 2001, the Ad Hoc 
Group for the Biological Weapons Convention negotiated these measures. Though there 
were multiple areas of the negotiation process that amplified the failure, one measure ended 
the Biological Weapons Convention’s negotiations completely in 2001—the verification 
protocol. This thesis argues for the removal of the verification protocol from the 
negotiation table in lieu of stalemate and paper tigers.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Biological Weapons Convention is the main international disarmament treaty 
that attempts to prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological 
and toxin weapons. In the 1990’s, the State Parties of this treaty entered into negotiations 
in an attempt to create mandates that would further prevent biological warfare, by 
focusing on facets of this treaty that are weak (Littlewood, 2012). From 1994 to 2001, the 
Ad Hoc Group for the Biological Weapons Convention negotiated these measures. 
Though there were multiple areas of the negotiation process that amplified the failure, 
one measure ended the Biological Weapons Convention’s negotiations completely in 
2001—the verification protocol. Unable to agree to an on-site verification protocol, 
where sites carrying the means for biological and toxin weapons would be regulated with 
inspections, the United States pulled out of negotiations in late 2001, prior to the the 
anthrax attacks in the United States. The United States disagreement pertaining to the on-
site verification protocol not only ended Ad Hoc Group negotiations, but led to the 
stalemate of future negotiations and stalled all other mandates from occurring that could 
possibly benefit this treaty.  
Biological warfare has been used since the first historical recordings of conflict. 
Rooted in the ancient past, biological agents and toxins were applied to win wars and 
deter the enemy, but not without the drawbacks of unintentional infection, injury, and 
death (Langford, 2004). Modern history, which advanced microbiology, induced the 
development of biological agents. Large wars, like World War I and II, started the race 
for offensive and defensive technologies, which led to nations that had the fiscal means 
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and purpose for biological warfare to begin research and development programs (R&D). 
On one hand, R&D programs gave nations and groups a sense of security against 
attackers as agents were isolated, studied, and weaponized into aerosols, powders, and 
bombs. Yet, on the other hand, the world was seeing the first effects of cutting-edge 
biological warfare. The use of biological and toxin weapons are silently waged battles for 
the main fact that they are only detectable after an attack has occurred. Not only do these 
weapons have the capabilities to vastly destroy life, but they also infect populations with 
immense psychological harm, including fear, paranoia, and isolation (Radosavljevic, 
Jakovljevic, 2007).  
International treaties were formed in light of the advancements in chemical and 
biological warfare (Kadlec, Zeicoff, 2000). In 1925, the Geneva Protocol, rejected the use 
of biological and chemical weapons but did not prohibit the stockpiling of these weapons. 
Second, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), was created in an attempt to give 
the international community a heightened sense of security towards biological warfare. 
The BWC was negotiated in Geneva from 1968-71, and opened for signature in 1972. As 
a supplement of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the BWC prohibited the development, 
production, and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons, and moreover, ordered 
their destruction. Unfortunately, the lack of enforcement in this treaty has led many 
professionals in the biological and toxins field to believe this treaty to be toothless, doing 
little to prevent potential biological warfare attacks (Christopher, Cieslak, Pavlin, & 
Eitzen, 1997; Hilleman, 2002; Littlewood, 2012). Since the first signatures of the BWC, a 
conference has been mandated to occur at least every 5 years (with ad hoc meetings every 
year or so), which reviews the BWC’s “operation, relevant scientific and technological 
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developments” (unog.ch/bwc). In essence, the review and ad hoc meetings have been a 
platform for nations’ representatives to negotiate confidence-boosting measures of this 
treaty. Since the first review conference in 1980, the BWC has been updated during every 
convention through multilateral negotiations between the participating nations. One 
update, which is highly regarded by the convention, was the creation of the 
Implementation Support Unit (ISU). The ISU was agreed on in 2007, and would be 
tasked with “administrative, CBM-related [confidence boosting measures], 
implementation, and universalization functions” (unog.ch/bwc). Other than the criticisms 
from biological arms researchers, the BWC has also faced some setbacks, including two 
signatory nations—Russia and Iraq—participating in activities that were prohibited by 
the convention (Christopher et al., 1997). These setbacks further demonstrate the BWC 
ineffectiveness of accomplishing their main goal: eradicating and preventing the 
proliferation of bioweapons (unog.ch/bwc).   
 At the start of the BWC, it was praised for being the first disarmament treaty for 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Littlewood, 2012). Yet, global security has 
changed in the 44 years since the BWC was born; the international community, 
concerned with the proliferation and use of WMD’s, seeks to have a treaty that relies on 
more than just mutual trust between the parties involved.  
 The key players in this BWC are China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and 
the United States, who all have the right to veto in the United Nations Security Council 
which give them undeniable power during the process of treaty creation. This right 
includes the ability to veto an investigation by the Security Council if a complaint is filed 
against a nation who is suspected of violating the terms of the convention.  
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Advancements in technology (e.g. vaccinations, and improved biological weapons 
detection) have given the world a semblance of hope pertaining to biological attacks. For 
the BWC, though, the major negotiated setback has been the inability to agree on the use 
of a verification system. Scientists in the field have regarded some stipulation of 
verification in any WMD treaty as incredibly important. An on-site verification system 
has been the main negotiated term that has left the BWC at a standstill. On-site 
verification procedures have been exhausted at the negotiation table, and for years, an 
agreement could not be reached. This discord eventually led the United States to refuse to 
negotiate on all protocol issues, which stopped the BWC’s progress towards a better 
treaty.  
Even though there is a lot of value to the on-site verification of laboratories that 
have the ability to weaponize, and stockpile biological agents and toxins, tabling the 
verification measure, for now, would be most beneficial for this treaty. The international 
political culture of arms control has changed since the beginning of this treaty, enabling 
negotiations to also change (Croft, 1996). In order to understand the negotiation process, 
and suggest improvements, this thesis seeks to analyze, and understand the changes that 
the BWC has faced over its 44 years. Research has supported the fact that there are more 
measures that, if negotiated, would lead towards a toothier treaty, yet, these issues are 
being suffocated by the contended on-site verification system. In lieu of another 
stalemate at the next conference, this thesis will argue that it is in the best interest of the 
BWC to table the verification system measure for now, and through a negotiation-based 
analysis, I will suggest solutions for the future.  
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To build on the main focus of this thesis—the Biological Weapons Convention’s 
negotiations during the 1990’s and its contended verification protocol—this paper will 
give a brief historical perspective of biological and toxin weapons, identify the main 
players involved in the BWC negotiations, survey the BWC and its negotiations, and in 
conclusion, argue removing the verification protocol from the table in lieu of stalemated 
negotiations.   
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
Working Definitions: 
For the purpose of this thesis, we will assume that biosafety is the “application of 
knowledge, techniques, and equipment to prevent personal, laboratory, or environmental 
exposure to potentially infectious agents or biohazards,” (medicinenet.com). Biosecurity 
can be defined as, all instances or measures that aid in, “(1) preventing inappropriate 
persons from gaining access to materials, equipment, or technology that could be used in 
producing biological weapons; or (2) detecting, characterizing, or responding to 
outbreaks of diseases that involve biological pathogens or toxins” (Countering biological 
threats, 2009).  
Because of the infrequency of biological weapons discussions, sometimes there is 
confusion when differentiating between chemical and biological weapons. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) defines biological agents as an agent that is designed to 
target human beings, plants, or animals with the intention of war, death, and/or harm by 
infecting them with disease-causing microorganisms and other biological entities, 
including viruses, infectious nucleic acids, prions, and toxins (World Health 
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Organization, 2004). In contrast to biological weapons, chemical weapons can be defined 
as weapons that are “effective because of the toxicity of their active principles.” 
Chemical weapons are also “biological” but do not have an infection state. Instead, 
chemical weapons are effective because of the active principles in them are engineered to 
be more toxic (i.e. saran gas, and tear gas) (World Health Organization, 2004). 
Bioterrorism is the intentional release of biological agents or toxins onto humans, 
animals, and plants to cause harm (Center for Disease Control, 2007).  
The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) has created a 
categorical list of priority pathogens [table 1]. This list was developed, and refined in 
conjunction with the group responsible for determining threats, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, and the group responsible for responding to emerging diseases, 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Every disease and agent on this list has a high level 
of threat if it was intentionally, or accidently released. The diseases and agents are 
categorized from A – C, based on certain severity factors, which are defined in table 1 
(NIAID, 2016).  
A Brief History of Biological and Toxin Weapons:  
Pre-modern history  
It is no secret that history dramatically influences the way international policy, 
and treaties are created. Moreover, the study of biological and toxin warfare gives us a 
glimpse into the impact that a biological attack would have on, not only a nation, but our 
world.  
Biological warfare is an ancient idea, and has been used for centuries to cripple 
groups of people (Christopher et al., 1997). Microorganisms and toxins were used in their 
 7 
 
Table 1 
Category A, B, and C Priority Pathogens 
Category/Definitions Diseases/Agents 
Category A 
The organisms/biological agents that pose the 
highest risk to national security and public health 
Can be easily disseminated or transmitted from 
person to person 
Result in high mortality rates and have the potential 
for major public health impact 
Might cause public panic and social disruption 
Require special action for public health 
preparedness  
 
  
 
Anthrax 
Botulism 
Plague 
Smallpox  
Tularemia  
Viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Ebola, Rift Valley 
Fever, Dengue) 
Category B 
Are moderately easy to disseminate 
Result in moderate morbidity rates and low 
mortality rates 
Require specific enhancements for diagnostic 
capacity and enhanced disease surveillance 
Brucellosis 
Glanders 
Psittacosis 
Ricin toxin 
Epsilon Toxin 
Staphylococcus enterotoxin B 
Typhus fever 
Food and waterborne pathogens (e.g., E.coli, 
Salmonella, Hepatitis A, Giardia Lamlia, 
Microspordia) 
Mosquito-borne encephalitis viruses (e.g., West 
Nile virus) 
Category C 
Third highest priority and include emerging 
pathogens that could be engineered for mass 
dissemination in the future 
Availability 
Ease of production and dissemination 
Potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and 
major health impact 
Emerging infectious diseases such as Nipah virus 
and hantavirus  
 Source: (https://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/biodefenserelated/biodefense/pages/cata.aspx) 
 
most basic forms before the twentieth century to inflict disease by contaminating fabrics, 
water, and food supplies, and using them on weapons (Langford, 2004). Excrement, 
human cadavers, animal carcasses, and contagions were used to inflict disease. Wells 
were contaminated with rye ergot—a mycotoxin found in a species of fungus, which 
causes death painfully through fluid loss (blood, vomiting, and diarrhea)—by the 
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Assyrians and the Persians in the 4th and 6th centuries B.C.E. Even earlier, Scythian 
archers (400 B.C.E.) used “poison” arrows, which were dipped in blood and manure 
against their enemies.  This primitive use of microorganisms still persists throughout 
history and was seen with the use of excrement on punji sticks by Viet Cong in the early 
1960’s (Christopher et al., 1997).  
 The quote, armis bella non venenis geri—“war is waged with weapons, not with 
poison,” was spoken by a Roman jurist after a poisoning of well-water occurred. This 
statement reflects the objectionable nature that was held towards biological terror even 
during the ancient era (Barnaby, 2000). The Roman general, Hannibal, circa 184 B.C.E., 
ordered the navy to throw clay pots filled with poisonous snakes onto enemy ships while 
in battle (Langford, 2004). Hannibal’s barbaric warfare made him victorious, and helped 
pave the way for the Romans to experiment further with toxins and microorganisms. The 
Romans catapulted hornets’ nests onto their enemies in battle, and poisoned numerous 
wells, reservoirs, and other water sources. This contamination was contributed to the 
Romans defeat of Aristonicus’ army and their continued reign of Rome.  
 One of the symptoms of biological warfare seems to be the spread of fear, which 
can lead to the defeat of a nation, even without the spread of any physical disease. An 
example of this tactic was seen throughout the Middle Ages, when dead animals and 
humans were catapulted over defensive walls. The siege of Thyne Levesque in 1340 A.D. 
located in present-day France, during the Hundred Years’ War, was one of the earliest 
attempts at throwing dead horses over castle walls. The Duke of Normandy won the 
battle without even causing disease to spread, yet, the fear of sickness was enough for the 
defenders to withdraw (Langford, 2004).  
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 With the observed effectiveness of this tactic, it became fairly common for 
attackers to throw the dead over walls, or contaminate water supplies with animals and 
humans during the Middle Ages. While looking for vectors of plague and leprosy, both 
living and dead humans, and animals were sought out during the Crusades. Furthermore, 
even infected individuals that were still alive were placed in containers filled with fecal 
matter and thrown over walls in the hopes of spreading disease.  
 The 14th century siege of Kaffa (present-day Ukraine) led the Tatars to catapult 
their own soldiers, who had died of plague, over their enemy’s defense walls in an 
attempt to infect them. Moreover, refugees of Kaffa, and possibly rats, infected with 
plague, boarded ships that traveled to Constantinople, Genoa, Venice, and other ports in 
the Mediterranean. Research supports the idea that this led to the second outbreak of 
plague, though, it is not certain that the physical throwing of plague-infested bodies was 
the main mechanism for the outbreak (Christopher et al., 1997). One of the main 
problems of biological warfare during the Middle Ages, which still remains an issue 
today, is that victorious armies that entered an area they defeated using a virus, would be 
infected, as well (Hillman, 2002). Along with the lack vaccines at the time, the use of 
biological weapons usually meant the spread, and destruction of more than just an 
opposing army. Moreover, lack of hygiene and sanitation practices greatly increased the 
risk of spreading, for example, the second outbreak of plague. In turn, this fact has lead 
scientists to believe that the sole act of catapulting infected vectors over walls might only 
be one factor that started the plague to spread for the second time in history (Christopher 
et al., 1997).  
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 Toxins also played a role in the pre-modern era. Batrachotoxin, sources from tree 
frogs, was used on the ends of spears in Hawaii, while aconite, from monkshood plant 
was used by the Moors in Spain in 1483. Chili peppers were used by the Inca in South 
America against the Portuguese, which when burned acted as a pre-modern tear gas 
(Langford, 2004).  
 One of the more discussed biological weapon attacks was the use of fomites 
against the Native Americans during the French and Indian War (1754-1767). While the 
transmission of smallpox through droplet transmission (the transmission of contaminated 
body fluid during sneezing, coughing, etc.) compared to by fomites (transmission when 
in contact with a contaminated object), is much more efficient, Captain Ecuyer (June 24, 
1763) gifting blankets from the smallpox hospital to the Native Americans still enabled 
the spread, and furthermore, smallpox epidemic of the Ohio River Valley tribes, who 
were not immune to this disease (Christopher et al., 1997).  
 A pattern arose from these cases of potential biological warfare to researchers. 
With an outbreak of a disease, humans were attempting to use it for their advantage, 
which makes it difficult for scientists to determine the (a) source of the disease and (b) 
vector of how is spread. This issue, that is discussed in detail later, poses a problem for 
modern day scientists seeking the reason for a particular disease outbreak; on one side, a 
naturally occurring epidemic can be suspected as odious terrorist activity, and may be 
used as propaganda against an enemy country. On the other side, actual biological 
warfare is easily disguised as naturally occurring, making biological and toxin warfare 
incredibly dangerous.  
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Modern History 
With the development of modern microbiology, scientists were able to start 
isolating, producing, and stockpiling pathogens. With his research in bacteriology, the 
German physician and microbiologist, Robert Koch, dramatically advanced this field by 
discovering the causative agents of some of the most relevant toxins used for biological 
weapons (Clunan, Lavoy, & Martin, 2008). For example, among Koch’s agents, was 
Bacillus anthracis, which he discovered was the causative agent of the disease anthrax. In 
his research, he discovered that anthrax spores could remain dormant under specific 
conditions, but also, under optimal conditions (like in a powder form), could be activated 
to cause disease. In turn, these advances in science changed the way the world understood 
warfare (Zilinskas, 2000). Along with Koch’s postulates, Louis Pasteur developed the 
microbiology field with his work with vaccination, pasteurization, and microbial 
fermentation. These advances were the seedlings for the some of the first modern 
attempts at biological terror during World War I (Hilleman, 2002).  
 During World War I, German forces attempted to infect the livestock of neutral 
trading partners, which they hoped would eventually disrupt the Allies’ food supply. 
Allegedly, cattle, sheep, horses, and mules, were injected and fed Bacillus anthracis and 
Burkholdera mallei during various points of the war: 1915 to 1918 in an attempt to infect 
Allied forces, resulting in the death of more than 200 mules, and in animal feed and 
inoculations devised to infect horses that were being exported to the French cavalry 
(Christopher et al., 1997; Langford, 2004). The death percentage of animals was small to 
the Allied forces, and resulted from the direct inoculation of these diseases. There is no 
documented zoonotic transmission of B. anthracis or B. mallei to the livestock the 
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Germans targeted, in turn, making the case of this biological weaponry widely seen to 
scientists as unsuccessful (Langford, 2004).  
 As World War I concluded, the international treaty in 1925, the Geneva Protocol, 
was created by the League of Nations, declaring, the “prohibition of the use in war of 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other Gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare” 
(state.gov, 2002). This treaty was the first to prohibit the use of biological and chemical 
weapons. The lack of prohibition on the development, stockpiling, and transfer of these 
weapons raised a major concern for the international community, leaving nations racing 
to research and develop pathogens for defensive and/or offensive measures [table 2] 
(Barnaby, 2000; Hilleman, 2002).  
 
Table 2 
Research and Development Programs Following the Geneva Protocol  
Nation Years 
France 1922 – 1928, 1934 – 1940  
USSR 1926 – unknown  
Japan 1932 – 1945  
Italy 1934 – restricted   
Hungary 1936 – unknown  
UK 1936 – unknown  
Canada 1938 – unknown 
China*  unknown 
Germany 1940 – unknown  
United States 1943 – 1969  
* suspected but not documented (Langford, 2000) 
(Hilleman, 2002; Langford, 2000) 
 
 In 1939, World War II had begun, and “bioweapons research achieved the level of 
high science with state of art and sophistication” (Hilleman, 2002, p. 3056). With most of 
the information stemming from somewhat inadequate intelligence reports [table 2], 
reliable data is scarce for the use of bioterror during World War II. Yet, some of the data 
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that has been collected during this time period includes the Japanese research and 
development program that started prior to World War II, during their occupation of 
Manchuria (Christopher et al., 1997).  While leading this program, in succession, the two 
directors—Shiro Ishii (1932-1942) and Kitano Misaji (1942-1945)—created Unit 731 in 
Harbin, China, which would be the hub of biological warfare research. With “150 
buildings, 5 satellite camps, and a staff of more than 3000 scientists and technicians,” 
Unit 731 experimented on prisoners by injecting them with pathogens [table 3], leading 
to the deaths of at least 10,000 captured prisoners, from either exposure or execution after 
inoculation (p. 413). Testimony from captured Unit 731 participants during a war crimes 
prosecution stated that there were at least 12 field trials of biological weapons in 11 
Chinese cities. These trials included contaminating water and food supplies, dropping 
biological cultures into houses, spraying pathogens from aircrafts, and dropping 
approximately 15-million plague-infested fleas over Chinese cities. Though advances in 
microbiology had come far, the Japanese were not properly prepared to handle this type 
of warfare, and an the attack on Changteh in 1941 left 1,700 Japanese troops dead, mostly 
of cholera. This issue that still plagues the use of bioweapons today, was one of the 
reasons in 1942, Unit 731’s field trials were terminated, and became a basic research 
facility until the end of World War II (Christopher et al., 1997; Hilleman 2002). After 
World War II, a treaty was formed between the United States and Japan. One factor of 
this treaty was that Unit 731 scientists gave the United States information on the research 
and trials that occurred for war crimes immunity.   
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Table 3 
Biological Weapons Research & Development During World War II 
Nation Number of workers 
(estimated) 
Main Research 
Germany 100-200 Offensive research prohibited 
UK 40-50 Agriculture and livestock diseases, 
foot-and-mouth, anthrax 
Japan 3000 +  Anthrax, Cholera, Shingella spp, 
Salmonella, Bubonic plague* 
USSR Several hundred  Typhus, Bubonic plague 
US* 1500 + Chemical herbicides, anthrax, 
brucellosis  
* The US’ R&D program started much later than other nations’ programs during WWII 
* all other large operations are sealed due to a United States treaty where immunity was 
granted for war crimes  
(Christopher et al., 1997; Hilleman, 2002) 
 
 While observing the effects of chemical and biological warfare on the world, 
President Roosevelt authorized Secretary of State Stimson, to establish an agency that 
would develop a program to combat biological warfare (Countering Biological Threats, 
2009). Under supervision of civilian agency, the War Reserve Service, the program 
started in 1942, nearing the end of the war. The main research facility was located at 
Camp Detrick, Md, with testing sites in Mississippi, and Utah, and a production plant in 
Indiana. The research collected during 1942 – 1945 went unused during this war. After 
World War II ended, the production plant was leased to a pharmaceuticals company, 
while Camp Detrick’s (now known as Fort Detrick) research facilities remained running 
(Christopher et al., 1997).  
The United States biological weapons research program was further developed, 
and expanded to a new production facility in Arkansas during the Korean War (1950 – 
1953). Advances in fermentation, storage, weaponization, and production occurred 
during this time [table 4].  
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Table 4 
Biological Agents Weaponized and/or Stockpiled by the US Military from 1945-1969 
(Destroyed 1971 -1973) 
Lethal Agents Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Botulinum toxin, 
Francisella tularensis (Tularemia) 
Incapacitating Agents Brucella suis, Coxiella bumetii (Q fever), 
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B, Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis virus, Yellow Fever  
Antiplant Agents* Rice Blast, Wheat stem rust, Rye stem rust 
*Stockpiled but not weaponized  
(Christopher et al., 1997; Countering Biological Threats, 2009; Hilleman, 2002) 
 
The United States was not safe from controversy, though, and was accused of 
using biological agents against North Korea by the Soviet Union, China, and North 
Korea. The group that investigated this accusation was implicated as being, “carefully 
controlled by the North Korean and Chinese governments” (p. 414). In turn, the United 
States requested an impartial party investigate these accusations. When the World Health 
Organization (WHO) offered to investigate as an impartial third party, North Korea and 
China denied the request, stating that the WHO was attempting espionage.  In an attempt 
to resolve this conflict that surrounded choosing an impartial party, 16 nations, including 
the United States, requested the United Nations form a neutral third party that would 
investigate this suspected attack, and future allegations. Unfortunately for the United 
States, the Soviet Union prevented the United Nations to intervene in this conflict.  
 An important factor to note is that during this conflict, the United States had an 
offensive biological weapons program which began in 1943, and they were suspected of 
working with former Unit 731 scientists, for information on the Japanese bioweapons 
program during World War II, after the immunity deal in 1945 (Zilinskas, 2000). In 
conjunction with the accusations about the use of bioweapons in North Korea, these 
elements destroyed the United States’ international goodwill efforts. The international 
 16 
community was witnessing how powerful propaganda could be on this issue of biological 
warfare especially because more nations were advancing, producing, and stockpiling 
biological weapons, along with the fact that not all bioweapons programs were reported 
[table 5] (Hilleman, 2002). 
The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War 
did not exclude biological weapons. Accusations of biological and toxin attacks were 
voiced by both nations.  The Soviet Union accused the United States of planning attacks 
in China, and Columbia, and releasing dengue in Cuba. In contrast, the United States 
blamed the Soviet Union for aerosolizing trichothecene mycotoxin, known better as 
“yellow rain,” and releasing it over Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. Most of the 
accusations remained unsubstantiated because biological agents are difficult to 
investigate (Radosavljevic, Jakovljevic, 2007). 
Table 5 
Reported bioweapons programs post World War II 
Country Time No. of 
personnel 
No. of major 
facilities  
No. of 
agents 
weaponized 
Stockpiled Used 
UK 1945-1972 ? 1 0 No No 
US 1945-
1969/1972 
3400 3 10 Yes No 
USSR 1945/1993 ~60000 ~35 10-12 (?) Yes ? 
Iraq 1975-present 
(?)* 
~300 7 5 Yes No 
South Africa 1981-1993 6-10 1 or 2 0 No Yes 
*Data collected in 2001 
Source: (Hilleman, 2002) 
 
Parties Discussed in the analysis of the Biological Weapons Convention: 
 The main parties that will be discussed in this paper include some of the Western 
Coalition State Parties (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada). These 
parties will be discussed in closer detail because of how their interests impacted the 
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negotiation process of the 1990’s and currently affect the BWC. Along with these 
western parties, Russia, Iraq, the NAM (non-aligned movement) states will also be 
discussed, due to the fact that these nations’ individual interests and relationships have 
been documented as impacting this treaty (Littlewood, 2012). Along with the State 
Parties, other parties that sit at this negotiation table include the scientific community and 
the private industry (i.e. pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies), which both have 
interests in the terms and conditions of a biological treaty [figure 1].  
 
Figure 1 
Party Map and Interests of the Biological Weapons Convention’s Negotiations 
 
 
(Lax & Sebenius, 2006)  
 
The Biological Weapons Convention: 
There were four studies that dramatically influenced the international community 
to develop a treaty for biological and toxin weapons: the United Nations (1969), the 
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Interdepartmental Political Military Group (1969), the WHO (1970), and the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (1971-73) studies (Zilinskas, 2000). These studies 
detailed the horrific impacts that biological warfare might have on the world if they are 
used. Moreover, they discussed the fact that biological warfare, like chemical weapons, 
most likely will be used on civilian populations because military personnel are vaccinated 
for agents, and much more equipped to defend against them. The moral outrage, which 
occurred after these studies were released, further supported President Nixon’s decision 
to end the United States’ offensive biological weapons program, in 1969 (Nixon, 1971).   
After seeing the impacts that proliferation and the advancement of biological 
weapons was having on the world, the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacterial (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on their Destruction, more commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC), was created [table 6] (unog.ch/bwc). The BWC was negotiated in Geneva, 
during 1968-71. The agreed upon text was identical to the text in a deal that predates the 
BWC between United States and Soviet Union had in mid-1971, called the Conference of 
the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The committee for the BWC was composed of 
18 nations. The BWC opened for signature on April 10, 1972, amidst the cold war, in 
London, Moscow, and Washington D.C. and entered into force on March 26, 1975 
(Langford, 2004). There were over 100 signatory nations including Iraq and members of 
the Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States). 
With the signatures of 162 states, this treaty mandated the destruction of any 
biological and toxin weapon stockpiles. Three State Parties, the United States, the Soviet 
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Table 6 
Key Provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention 
Article Provision  
Article I Never under any circumstances to acquire or retain biological weapons. 
 
Article II To destroy or divert to peaceful purposes biological weapons and associated resources 
prior to joining. 
Article III Not to transfer, or in any way assist, encourage or induce anyone else to acquire or 
retain biological weapons. 
Article IV To take any national measures necessary to implement the provisions of the BWC 
domestically. 
Article V To consult bilaterally and multilaterally to solve any problems with the implementation 
of the BWC. 
Article VI To request the UN Security Council to investigate alleged breaches of the BWC and to 
comply with its subsequent decisions. 
Article VII To assist States which have been exposed to a danger as a result of a violation of the 
BWC. 
Article X To do all of the above in a way that encourages the peaceful uses of biological science 
and technology 
Source: unog.ch/bwc 
 
Union, and the United Kingdom were designated as Depositaries of the Convention. By 
the time the BWC entered into force, State Parties had deposited and, thus, destroyed 
instruments of ratification, which included toxin and biological strains and other modes 
of weaponry, like missile containers. There were also internal ratification measures that 
occurred in each nation during this time, including the dismantlement of offensive 
programs around the globe. At the time, it was hailed as the first “multilateral 
disarmament treaty to ban the production and use of an entire category of weapons” 
(unog.ch/bwc, p.1). 
Transformation of the BWC 
 According to the convention, this treaty has “strived to ensure that the Convention 
remains relevant and effective, despite the changes in science and technology, politics 
and security since it entered into force” (unog.ch/bwc). In doing so, the BWC has 
mandated a conference to occur every five years (Article XII) since it entered into force 
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in 1975. Since the birth of the BWC, there have been seven review conferences (eighth 
review scheduled for 2016) where state parties multilaterally agreed on an updated 
document [table 7].  
 
Table 7 
Decisions made by the Review Conferences  
Review 
Conference 
Date Main Amendments/Decisions 
1 Mar 3 – 21, 1980 • Texts of implementation measures should 
be provided to the United Nations 
2 Sept 8 – 26, 1986 • Permitted the WHO to coordinate 
emergency response measures in cases of 
alleged use of biological and toxin 
weapons 
• Established the Confidence Boosting 
Measures (CBMs) 
3 Sept 9 – 27, 1991 • Requested state parties to re-examine 
implementation measures 
• Revised Formal Consecutive Meetings 
• Revised CBMs 
• Encouraged United Nations Secretary-
General to conduct investigations into 
allegations of biological and toxin use 
• Established Ad Hoc Group of 
governmental experts, entitled VEREX 
4 Nov 25 – Dec 6, 1996 • Established that all destruction and 
conversion activities of former weapons 
and related facilities should takes place 
prior to accession to the convention 
5 Nov 19, 2001 – no agreement*  
 
Suspended until Nov 11 – 22, 2002  
• Established a series of annual Meetings of 
Experts and Meetings of States Parties in 
order to strengthen the convention 
6 Nov 8 – 20, 2006 • Series of decisions of recommendations to 
strengthen the convention 
• Creation of the Implementation Support 
Unit (ISU) 
• Plan of Action to expand membership 
7 Dec 5 – 22, 2011  • Established a re-structuring of the 
intercessional meetings to include specific 
agenda items including developments in 
science and technology, promoting 
cooperation and assistance, and 
strengthening national implementation  
*No agreement due to divergent positions on the Ad Hoc Group. Agreements made in 
2002 for Fifth Review Conference 
Source: unog.ch/bwc 
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 Over the years, the state parties have adapted the BWC to better fit the world’s 
adapting interests. In the convention’s literature (unog.ch/bwc), these adaptations have 
been influenced by not just state parties’ interests, but also, the overall “mission” of the 
BWC—to stop the proliferation, and offensive research of biological and toxin weapons. 
In order to understand the negotiated agreements of the State Parties, the main changes to 
the treaty should be discussed. Table 7 addresses all the changes that were made to the 
treaty. An explanation of the key developments of this treaty will make the analysis of the 
Ad Hoc Group negotiations more transparent later.  
Establishment of the Confidence Boosting Measures 
 One way to determine the BWC’s rate of compliance within state parties, is by 
analyzing the first measure that sought to increase confidence in the convention: the 
confidence boosting measures.   
During the early years of the BWC, an erosion of confidence between the State 
Parties lead to the Convention’s willingness to implement a series of measures that would 
help to bolster trust between the parties involved (Littlewood, 2012). In turn, during the 
second review conference in 1986, a section of the treaty entitled, Confidence Boosting 
Measures (CBMs) was established. The CBMs have been updated and expanded over the 
years to its current form [table 8]. A meeting was held in coordination with the scientific 
community, with what the BWC calls a “meeting of scientific and technical experts,” 
where the CBMs were created for the state parties. Annually, every April, State Parties 
turn in these CBMs to the BWC. Yet, the conference did not see very much participation 
on these CBMs from State Parties [Figure 2] (Chevrier, Koblentz, 2011). In lieu of 
compliance and the degradation of confidence between the parties at the time, the 
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conference agreed to expand the CBMs at the third review conference (unog.ch/bwc). 
These expansions attempted to establish some semblance of trust between the parties by 
asking for more data about each nation’s laboratories involved in biological and toxin 
research [table 8]. The CBM form, for example, asks for nations to declare any research 
and development laboratories, including the staff, containment centers, and pathogens 
involved (“CBM sample form,” unog.ch/bwc). With the expansion of CBMs in 1991, 
returns from state parties were at a record high, with about a third of the membership 
reporting on these measures.  
 In 2006, at the sixth review conference, the newly established Implementation 
Support Unit (ISU), which was the first staffed program of the BWC, made the CBM 
submissions completely electronic. The ISU also acted as the first fulltime administrators 
of the CBMs, which included reminding the State Parties when the due dates of the 
CBMs and helping with fill out the documentation. In the years following this change, the 
CBM returns increased. In 2010, 70 State Parties submitted CBM documentation, which 
still meant only 43% of the membership was compiling to these measures. Furthermore, 
even if state parties participated in the CBMs, data was disjointed and missing from the 
filled out forms. Another factor, which may have impacted these returns, was the 
increased membership from 100 state parties, in 1975, to 175 state parties, as of 2015 
[Figure 3]. 
The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) 
 First established at the sixth review conference, in 2006, the ISU is described by 
the BWC as the convention’s staff responsible for providing administrative support and 
assistance to state parties. The ISU is comprised of three staff members who work at the 
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Table 8 
Confidence Boosting Measures (CBMs) Description (Revised 2011) 
CBM A Part 1: Exchange of data on research centers and 
laboratories; 
Part 2: Exchange of information on national 
biological defense research and development 
programs. 
CBM B Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious 
diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins. 
CBM C Encouragement of publication of results and 
promotion of use of knowledge 
CBM E Declaration of legislation, regulations and other 
measures. 
CBM F Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or 
defensive biological research and development 
programs 
CBM G Declaration of vaccine production facilities 
*CBM D: active promotion of contacts, omitted in 2011  
Source: unog.ch/bwc 
 
 
Figure 2 
Number of Confidence Boosting Measure Returns from State Parties  
 
Red Points: Changes in CBMs 
Source: unog.ch/bwc  
 
 
Geneva Branch of the United Nations. This support includes assistance with the CBMs, 
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Figure 3 
Biological Weapons Convention Membership as of 2015  
 
*Signatory: nation that has signed the BWC but has not ratified it yet 
Source: unog.ch/bwc 
 
purpose of this paper, the ISU supports, “efforts to implement the decisions and 
recommendations of the review conference,” that is, they act as facilitators of information 
sharing between state parties before review conferences occur.  
The VEREX 
 The VEREX was established in 1991 at the third review conference. This group, 
comprised of scientific and governmental experts, wrote a report identifying possible 
verification measures for the BWC, from a scientific and technical standpoint. These 
experts were tasked with evaluating certain areas of verification that the conference was 
concerned with [table 9].   
The chairman of the BWC, in 1993, created a report following the meeting the 
VEREX, which stated that there are potential verification measures that would improve 
the Convention’s overall goal, including on-site laboratory verification, declarations,  
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Table 9 
VEREX Criteria for Evaluating Verification Measures 
1. Strengths and weaknesses based on but not limited to the amount and quality of information they provide 
and fail to provide.  
2. Ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities.  
3. Ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance.  
4. Their technological, material, manpower and equipment requirements.  
5. Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications.  
6. Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted 
activities; and their implications for the confidentiality of Commercial Proprietary Information (CPI). 
Source: BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9 
 
inspections, and remote and satellite surveillance [table 10] (BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, 
1993). The Chairman’s report of the VEREX’s research described that, though these 
verification measures have strengths and weaknesses, “…some of the potential 
verification measures would contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and improve 
the implementation of the Convention, [and]…that appropriate and effective verification 
could reinforce the Convention,” (BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8, 1993, p. 8). Along with the 
suggestions for advanced verification measures, the VEREX Group supported the idea 
that state parties becoming more transparent with each other, would mend trust between 
nations, and in turn, increase overall confidence in the BWC.  
 
Table 10 
Verification Measures Identified and Evaluated by the VEREX 1993 
Off-site Measures • Information Monitoring: surveillance of publications; surveillance of 
legislation; data on transfers, transfer requests and production multilateral 
information sharing.  
• Data exchange: declarations; Notifications. Remote Sensing: surveillance 
by satellite; surveillance by aircraft; ground-based surveillance. 
• Inspections: sampling and identification; observation; auditing. 
On-site Measures  • Exchange visits: international arrangements.  
• Inspections: interviewing; visual inspections; identification of key 
equipment; auditing; sampling and identification; medical examination. 
• Continuous monitoring: by instruments; by personnel. 
Source: (BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8, 1993, p. 3-4)  
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 The VEREX report brought on a new wave of the BWC (Langford, 2004). In an 
attempt to negotiate some of the verification measures that the VEREX suggested, the 
BWC decided to create an Ad Hoc Group that would hold 24 sessions over the seven 
years for this purpose (unog.ch/bwc).  
The Ad Hoc Group Negotiations 
  Explained in further detail in the discussion section, the Ad Hoc Group 
negotiations, which were held to finalize a better verification measure, did not come to an 
agreement. Over the course of 24 scheduled sessions, (23 July – 17 August 2001), the 
group could not come to a consensus on the issue of on-site verification measures. The 
failure of this Ad Hoc group to reach a resolution, is the most crippling disagreement the 
BWC has seen thus far (Chevrier, Koblentz, 2011; Langford, 2004; Littlewood, 2012).  
Establishment of National Implementation Measures 
 In 2003, the newly instated annual Meeting of State Parties expanded on The 
VEREX Group’s work to enable better national standards for each State Party 
(unog.ch/bwc). The BWC states that it is the responsibility of the individual State Party to 
ensure that the national standards of each nation complies with the mission of the 
convention. Yet, because of the legal, fiscal, and constitutional differences of each nation, 
an overarching national standard would be difficult for each State Party. Instead, the 
BWC focused on two topics for the betterment of international security: the adoption of 
measures that allows nations to effectively secure and control the pathogens and toxins 
that are contained within each State Party’s border.  
 In 2004, the Meeting of State Parties focused on how the BWC could strengthen 
the surveillance, detection, and diagnosis of biological weapons, while combating 
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infectious diseases. This meeting also looked at enhancing the capabilities that 
investigation teams have when outbreaks occur. In turn, the United Nations Security 
Council was endorsed by the General Assembly to lead any investigations that were 
suspicious to the Convention (unog.ch/bwc).  
 The BWC was created because the international community was lacking a 
biological arms treaty that prohibited the development and stockpiling of biological 
warfare. Before the BWC, the only other disarmament agreement was the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925, which only prohibited the use of biological weapons as warfare. The 
BWC’s wording was almost identical to the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament, which was an agreement reached in 1971 between the United Kingdom, 
United States, and Soviet Union. In an attempt to adapt the BWC to changing political, 
scientific, and global structures, the signatory nations of this treaty meet every five years, 
with other ad hoc, scientific expert meetings (VEREX Group) occurring in-between. The 
BWC has gone through a swarm of changes throughout the forty-one years it has existed, 
including the implementation of bilateral and multilateral engagement to resolve any 
issues signatory nations are having, restructuring of the document to include scientific 
advances, and the creation of the Implementation Support Unit. Yet, this treaty has been 
weakened by the lack of substantial provisions because of the inability for parties to agree 
on verification procedures.  
CHAPTER III 
DISCUSSION 
 The Biological Weapons Convention has been criticized for its lack of power over 
the stockpiling, defensive research, and use of biological and toxin weapons (Christopher, 
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Cieslak, Pavlin, & Eitzen, 1997; Hilleman, 2002; Littlewood, 2012). This criticism has 
not gone unnoticed by the BWC and has been reinforced by the VEREX report of 1993 
(Hilleman, 2002). As previously discussed, a toothless treaty may factor into the potential 
use of biological weapons, leading the international community to feel powerless. One 
reason the BWC has been unable to fix this problem is the issue of verification, which is 
demonstrated in the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Group from 1991 to 2001.  
 To understand the reason negotiations have failed for the BWC, I will analyze the 
time frame between 1991 to 2001, which was the ten-year phase that covered the 
negotiations of State Parties—from the pre-negotiation to late negotiation stages—in the 
convention’s attempt to agree on legally binding measures of verification (Littlewood, 
2012). In an attempt to organize and simplify the issues the Ad Hoc Group faced during 
negotiations, I have broken the negotiation timeline into pre-negotiation, negotiation, and 
final negotiation phases.  
The Pre-Negotiation Phase (1991 – 1994):  
The phase that started in 1991 for the BWC is important because it marks the start 
of the convention’s willingness to dramatically improve and shift the treaty’s terms from 
solely trust-based measures to legally binding agreements. Yet, the willingness to 
improve this treaty may have started prior to 1991. The seed of a more impactful treaty 
was planted when the convention agreed to CBMs, which marked a readiness of the state 
parties to invest more effort into the BWC (Littlewood, 2012). 
 A merging of players that were and were not visible at the negotiation table, 
played a role in impacting the Ad Hoc negotiations for the legally binding measures. As 
previously discussed, the scientific community’s governmental VEREX report of 1993 
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supported verification measures. The political players involved in the early 1990’s 
marked a change following the end of the Cold War. Lastly, public opinion, in the form 
of nongovernmental, private, and university research, which mostly criticized the 
toothless treaty measures, played a role in this pre-negotiation phase (Hilleman, 2002).  
The Shift in Political Power and Interests  
 The United States was opposed to ad hoc negotiations towards a verification 
protocol for the BWC in the early 1990’s (U.S. Congress, 1993). Similarly, this stance 
was reflected during Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at the time, which was 
politically influenced under the administration of President George H.W. Bush. Yet, with 
the shift in political power in the United States, this position also changed. The Clinton 
Administration “fully supported the preparation of a protocol containing a regime to 
strengthen the BWC” (United Nations, 1994). Littlewood describes this political shift as, 
“effectively tipp[ing] the balance of power in the BWC to those favoring new 
negotiations” (Littlewood, 2012, p. 110). Furthermore, in a special meeting in 1994, state 
parties agreed to establish the Ad Hoc Group, which would negotiate protocols for the 
BWC.  
 In a compromise between the United States, India, Iran, and the European Union 
member states, a mandate was agreed upon, which built the Ad Hoc Group’s agenda for 
negotiations. This mandate included, “negotiating issues of definitions of terms, 
confidence building measures, compliance measures, and measures to promote peaceful 
cooperation among the states parties” (p. 110). The Ad Hoc group was required to 
address all mandate sections set forth by this deal and to create a final document once the 
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negotiations were complete. From 1995 to 2001, the protocol negotiations continued 
[table 11].  
Table 11 
Phases of the Negotiation Process  
Negotiation Phase/Year Key Changes 
Pre-Negotiation (1991-1994) 1993: VEREX Report suggesting provisions to the 
BWC, including verification measures  
1994: Creation of Mandate that stated what would 
be covered in the Ad Hoc negotiations: definitions 
of terms, confidence building measures, compliance 
measures, measures to promote peaceful 
cooperation among the states parties 
Negotiations (1995-1999) 1995: Implemented the “rolling text” style of 
negotiation  
1996: Extended negotiations because of the 
complex nature of issues needing to be negotiated 
Final Negotiations (2000-2001)  2000: Final text was given out by Chairman. Ad 
Hoc group was asked to submit final revisions. 
2001: Rejection of final draft; United States refuses 
to continue negotiations but does not leave the table   
(Littlewood, 2012) 
 
The Negotiations (1995 – 2000): 
 Targeted to end in 1996, the protocol negotiations went much longer than was 
expected by the state parties. One reason for this extension was the fact that the Ad Hoc 
group had to cover a multitude of issues. First, the issue of legal implications constantly 
arose during negotiations. Unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review in 1995, 
there were no legal implications of the Ad Hoc meeting failing to negotiate a protocol for 
the BWC (Langford, 2004). Furthermore, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 would still stand 
even without group consensus, and the BWC would still be in place. The only thing that 
the BWC would lack was the addition of protocols, which still needed to be ratified and 
signed by the rest of the member states after the Ad Hoc group prepared a final 
document. The Ad Hoc group could agree on legally binding measures for the BWC, yet, 
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not all negotiated measures needed to be legally binding. A legally binding measure in 
any treaty holds more power than politically binding one. In turn, the Ad Hoc members 
were observed as judging the importance of the issues by if one or the other was 
negotiated as being legally binding (Littlewood, 2012). 
 Another issue that came up during the negotiations was the 1994 mandate. Under 
this mandate, “disputes along a north-south axis of conflict was readily apparent” (p. 
111). Developing nations who were involved in the Ad Hoc meetings disputed the export 
controls that the protocol viewed as key diminishing proliferation of biological weapons. 
In comparison with this dispute, arguments occurred over the definitions of objective 
criteria in compliance issues with the Western and Eastern nations (Ward, 2004).  
 The last issue is that arose during negotiations pertained to noncompliance issues 
between State Parties. One of these compliance issues that caused the destruction of trust 
between members was the “blatant violation…[from] the Soviet Union’s continued 
research of offensive biological warfare,” until at least 1992 when President Boris Yeltsin 
stated that he would put an end any further research and production (Hay, 2000, p. 812; 
Christopher et al, 1997). In a 1995 report done by the US National Institute, the Russian 
program still had an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 employees. Furthermore, the Iraqi 
offensive biological weapons program was uncovered following the Persian Gulf War 
due to the United Nations inspections. There were two treaties separate from the BWC 
that addressed these trust issues (Christopher et al, 1997). The Trilateral Agreement 
between the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, in 1991, and the United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). These agreements may have only partially 
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addressed the degrading trust between member states, though, which impacted the 
negotiations on compliance within this treaty (Littlewood, 2012).  
 During 1995 to 1997, the VEREX findings were analyzed and addressed by the 
Ad Hoc Group meetings, which also allowed the expansion and development of each 
party’s main interests. Following this early phase, from 1997 to mid-2000, key issues that 
needed to be negotiated by the Ad Hoc Group surfaced.  
  The Chairman of the Ad Hoc group, Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary, who 
also chaired the VEREX committee, used a draft protocol similar to the single text 
negotiation style, identified by Fisher and Ury, to negotiate the protocol issues (Fisher, 
Ury, 1983; Littlewood, 2012). This “rolling text” was the sole pamphlet for negotiations 
and went through a series of changes from the seventh to twenty-second session of the 
Ad Hoc Group meetings (Littlewood, 2012). The text went through a series of over 
fourteen-hundred changes because of a lack of consensus between parties. The Chairman 
used separate meetings to help resolves issues identified from the early stages of the 
protocol negotiation. These discrete agenda items were separated into Friends of the 
Chair (12 in total) meetings that were held with smaller groups of members attending. As 
the negotiations narrowed by the year 2000, the chairman’s rolling text went into its final 
draft stages. During the late stages of negotiations, the Ad Hoc group would leave every 
session with two documents: the rolling draft and formal proposals from the Friends of 
the Chair, which were composed of various compromises to consider for the next session. 
With less than a dozen people seeing the Chairman’s final draft, it was given to the Ad 
Hoc group for viewing on March 30, 2001.  
 
 33 
The Consensus Rule 
 The Chairman’s final draft was an accumulation of negotiations from the seven 
years prior to 2001, which was comprised of compromises from every member of this Ad 
Hoc Group. Ipsen identifies the overarching theme of this draft when he reflects on arms 
control agreements as, “fragile construction[s] of compromises and a minimum 
consensus related to highly controversial issues” (as cited in, Littlewood, 2012, p. 115). 
As previously discussed, the BWC was the identical text that the Soviet Union and the 
United States agreed within the CCD. This deal between superpowers, which was 
presented to other nations as fait accompli, was not reflected in the protocol negotiations 
of the Ad Hoc group. In turn, this multilateral negotiation gave every party the right to 
veto and derail the entire draft, which was used as leverage throughout the negotiation 
process.  
Final Negotiations (2000 – 2001): 
 During the weeks leading up to the final scheduled session of the Ad Hoc group, 
State Parties were asked to submit final comments for revisions to the final draft. More 
than 50 states agreed to negotiate the final draft presented by the Chairman, yet, there 
were also an estimated of 300 comments and requests for changes. Included in these 
requests, China, Cuba, Iran, Indonesia, Libya, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka rejected the 
chairman’s draft in May 2001.  Moreover, a lot of these requests contradicted one 
another, which made it impossible to create a consensus between parties. In the end, the 
United States’ lack of commitment to return to negotiations in 2001, alongside the 
rejection of the final draft from these 7 nations, led the Ad Hoc Group negotiations to 
capsize from the weight of extensive, derailing compromises.  
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 The United States closed the door on these protocol negotiations. Though the Ad 
Hoc Group lacked consensus on the final draft, the United States’ rejection of the final 
draft and the decision to leave negotiations was “comprehensive and final” (p. 116). The 
formal statement by the United States stated that the mandate set for the Ad Hoc Group 
was not achievable in the protocol negotiations. By the United States refusing to 
negotiate, but not leaving the table, negotiations could not continue, and therefore 
collapsed.  
 On the surface, it is easy to say that the United States’ decision to reject the final 
draft was the reason these negotiations failed. The political changes in the United States 
in 2001 impacted this rejection quite a bit. With the beginning of the George W. Bush 
Administration, this nation reverted to the political tone that was established prior to the 
Clinton Administration. President Clinton was also seen as “lack[ing] direct involvement 
in the BWC [and] in contrast, President George W. Busk (and opponents of the BWC 
Protocol) did not” (p. 128). Furthermore, even though these protocol negotiations are 
commonly known as “verification negotiations,” the United States strongly objected 
verification protocols. In turn, this word did not appear of the final draft, or any other 
rolling text by the chairman. Interestingly enough, when the United States withdrew from 
negotiations in 2001, the issue on verification measures was the main reason they openly 
cited for ending negotiations. The USIP in 2002 noted that, “U.S. negotiators [are 
stylistically] forceful, explicit, legalistic, urgent, and results-oriented…[and] although 
these traits inevitably vary according to personalities and circumstances, a recognizably 
pragmatic American style is always evident” (USIP, 2002). Yet, the internal changes, 
even coupled with the negotiation styles in the United States cannot be the only factor 
 35 
into the rejection of this protocol, especially when there was still an overwhelming lack 
of support for the final draft, so what were these other factors? Furthermore, with other 
factors that were impacting the completion of this protocol, would there have been a final 
even if the United States supported it?  
 We will never know the answer to the second question, yet, for my analysis, I will 
delve into other diagnoses for the failed negotiations this Ad Hoc Group faced during this 
process. The causes discussed include the complex nature of multilateral treaty making, 
the lack of support staff during the negotiations, the breakdown of trust between the 
parties, the commercial and stakeholder interests away from the negotiation table, 
framing and loss aversion, and the factor of timing [table 12]. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS 
The Reasoning behind failed Protocol Negotiations  
 The environment that surrounds arms control contains a multi-faceted network, 
comprised of diplomats, experts from capitals, and governmental and private sector 
scientists. While factoring in the number of players in the room during negotiations, with 
the differing levels of expertise, the complex nature of a multilateral negotiation increases 
(Boyer, 2012). Even with a clear division of roles, players rely on each other’s 
knowledge to make informed decisions as a team negotiation, which can be challenging 
for even the most advanced negotiators. Moreover, most negotiators, especially in the 
arms control environment, are not making decisions on their own behalf, and in the case 
of the protocol negotiations, were chosen, or elected by the capital they represent (Lang, 
1993).  In turn, during these negotiations, there were of lengths of time where the 
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negotiators had to check back in with their bosses (confirm with the capital). These 
delays may have been used as a tactic for some negotiations, but for others, this time 
delay was just another factor in the culture of arms control (Zabriskie, 1998). However,  
 
 
Table 12 
3D Analysis of Ad Hoc Group Negotiations  
Focus Barriers Approach  
Tactics: win-win and win-lose styles 
between parties 
  
• Russia, United States, and 
China: competitive style 
(win-lose) 
  
 
• Hardball tactics: i.e. United 
States rejecting protocol has 
stalled negotiations 
• Destruction of 
relationships: trust issues 
between parties 
• Breakdown of 
communication: leads to 
misunderstandings between 
state parties and prolonged 
negotiation processes  
• Switch tactics to a win-win 
approach: focus on overall 
goal of treaty—ensuring the 
security of all nations 
decreases the likelihood of 
BW attacks 
• Improve communication 
between parties: adding a 
support team of facilitators, 
establish idea creation at the 
table 
• Repair trust between 
parties: establishing 
goodwill efforts by 
increasing confidence-
boosting mandates  
Deal Design: value and substance 
 
• Established values of BWC: 
a treaty that decreases the 
likelihood of the use and 
proliferation of BW while 
ensuring the destruction of 
stockpiles 
 
• Lack of agreements for the 
parties that are realistic or 
desirable  
 
• “Go back to the drawing-
board” to create options by 
focusing on interests and 
not positions  
• Meet objectives and 
timelines 
• Stick to the structure of the 
negotiation (i.e. single-text 
style) 
 
Setup: scope and sequence 
 
Parties: 
1. State-parties 
2. Biotech and pharmaceutical 
companies 
3. Scientific community (i.e. 
VEREX group) 
  
 
• Parties: too many parties 
are at the table, not all the 
parties are at the table, or 
the wrong parties are at the 
table 
• Issues, interests, or 
BATNA’s do not support 
an agreeable outcome 
Ensure the most favorable outcome 
for all parties by: identifying 
interests, “no-deal options,” and the 
right parties are at the table) 
 
Architecture:  
1. State-party interests: value 
the protection of borders 
from biological weapons 
attacks 
a. Case Study: United 
States Interests— 
protecting the 
interests of donors 
(in this case the 
 37 
biotech/pharmaceu
tical companies), 
protecting national 
security  
2. Biotech and pharmaceutical 
interests: dislike further 
regulations that increase 
costs and production times, 
and want to keep 
proprietary information 
secure  
3. Scientific Community: 
increase stability and safety 
of biological weapons 
research  
 
 
 (Lax & Sebenius, 2006)  
 
these complex issues cannot account to a failed negotiation entirely. For example, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention dealt with similar factors and resolved complex issues 
from 1980-1992 (Littlewood, 2012). 
One aspect this particular arms control negotiation lacked was a support staff. 
Boyer claims that the more complex a multilateral negotiation is, the more staffing there 
needs to be to facilitate it (Boyer, 2012). Most of the Ad Hoc Group members had 
previously worked with each other on arms control negotiations and were described as 
being professionals in the field (Littlewood, 2012). The one facilitator for these meetings 
was chairman Ambassador Tóth, who can be described as the institutional support. The 
fact that these negotiations dragged on for so many years makes it difficult to pinpoint a 
turning point if/where Tóth disrupted negotiations. Some evidence that is apparent is the 
single text negotiating style Tóth decided to implement. Though it seemed to be 
successful for moving negotiations along in the early Ad Hoc sessions of negotiations, 
this style became less useful near the end because it was used more to gain more 
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concessions by State Parties who halted the process with requests of revisions. The 
institutional support also needs to have advanced facilitators that can transcend the 
competitive atmosphere of arms control negotiations into an agreement for all (Albin, 
2012). Yet, if the issues at the table are too tangled for a multilateral negotiation, even an 
excellent facilitator may not be able to enable a resolution, given the difficulty of 
implementation. Up to the final draft of the protocol, the negotiations were characterized 
as successful in a lot of ways. Multilateral negotiations can have an excessive amount of 
logrolling, without an agreement of a more important, larger interest of the group. This 
issue might have been a factor in the rejections of negotiations in 2001 (Littlewood, 
2012).  
 Even with the parties preparing for these negotiations, there can be a great deal of 
uncertainty of the expected interests, and therefore, the outcomes of negotiating with 
multiple parties (Jonsson, 2012). This uncertainty was intensified by the confusion about 
other parties’ bargaining positions during negotiations (Littlewood, 2012; Shell, 2006). 
United States withdrew from negotiations in 2001 and avoided negotiating the 
verification all together. Some experts believe that the avoiding style of negotiation is not 
an actual strategy, but rather, an abandonment of the problem. In the example of the 
United States, though, this style proved itself to be a real strategy because it forced the 
rest of the Ad Hoc group to stop negotiations and in turn, stalled the verification 
protocols indefinitely or until the United States chose to negotiate them again. There was 
a fair amount of accommodation (backing down from your interests) during the last 
meetings of the Ad Hoc group, in an attempt to agree on a final draft (Shell, 2006; 
Littlewood, 2012). The issue with accommodation in the BWC, is that negotiators can 
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take advantage of each other if they do not follow through with this bargaining standard. 
For example, as previously discussed, the single-text protocol negotiation was edited 
numerous times by each party. Parties believed that others would use the norm of 
reciprocity (“I accommodated with that edit, now you accommodate next”) as the 
bargaining standard in the final draft. This assumption did not prove correct. Some 
parties felt they had accommodated in an attempt for all parties to agree to a final draft 
(the bargaining standard in this case) only to be asked to accommodate on even more 
issues later on. The collaborative strategy (also known as the problem-solving strategy) is 
described by Shell as problem-solving “through good analysis and candid disclosure of 
interests, find[ing] the most elegant solution by brainstorming many options, and 
resolv[ing] tough issues using fair standards and criteria” (Shell, 2006, p. 11). This 
strategy is most desirable in multilateral, complex negotiations like the Ad Hoc protocol 
meetings (Croft, 1996; Shell, 2006). In an attempt to create a collaborative protocol, the 
BWC extended negotiations, previously discussed, through 2001. Throughout the years, 
though, the complex nature of the issues being discussed and the verification problems 
broke down some of the collaborative efforts of the parties (Littlewood, 2012).  
Shell describes relationships as one of the six foundations of effective 
negotiations (Shell, 2006). In the case of this protocol negotiation, there was a large 
amount of distrust between the State Parties (with noncompliance by state parties 
lingering in the background of these negotiations). Shell describes “people 
[as]…complex and unpredictable,” let alone groups of negotiators who work for nations 
with changing political climates and external stakeholders (p. 63). Moreover, with the 
breakdown of trust between the parties, “deals are harder to negotiate, more difficult to 
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implement, and vulnerable to changing incentives and circumstances,” which was a 
major issue when dealing with the implementation issues, and increased vulnerability of 
the parties (p. 59). This factor may have influenced the state parties to maintain belief 
perseverance (the tendency to cling onto one belief even when presented further 
information on the subject) throughout the process. In these negotiations, “risk aversions 
was evident, with a high propensity to highlight losses and play up concessions and 
compromises on each side,” which may have helped the create coalitions, and thereafter, 
groupthink (Littlewood, 2012, p.121). The negotiation style of arms control enables 
groupthink to occur (Myrdal, 1976). During the process of arms control, “negotiators 
transfer similar approaches, processes, and mechanisms to other problem areas in hope of 
resolving differences,” and though problem solving tactics can be helpful when used 
broadly, it can also leave negotiations stagnant, and repetitive (Littlewood, 2012, p. 123). 
For example, the popular complaint by the United States was that the state parties 
attempted to mirror the approaches used in the CWC for this protocol negotiation, and 
though there are similarities in these two treaties, there are also drastic differences. For 
example, the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group covered much more complex scientific 
topics on nonproliferation than the CWC, which required more scientific and expert 
support during negotiations (Christopher et al, 1997). As a field, biological and toxin 
pathogens is a complex topic which takes years of advance education and experience to 
understand. The negotiators were comprised of professionals with treaty negotiation and 
disarmament backgrounds, not biological sciences. Moreover, some issues were either, 
not being addressed, or being handled incorrectly because of the lack of technological 
knowledge on the part of the negotiators.  
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Within the formation of the Ad Hoc Group, there are the politically influenced 
coalitions that already existed before the time of these negotiations (i.e. the western, and 
NAM coalitions). However, when a coalition does not agree, which occurred between the 
United States and its allies, this group cannot rely on belief perseverance between its 
members. This lack of coherence led to the degradation of support during caucuses 
between coalitions, which in turn, led to further disputes during negotiations with the 
entire group.   
 There is also evidence that framing and loss aversion influenced disputes during 
Ad Hoc Group meetings because of the differing perspectives of the mandates being 
negotiated. For example, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states overemphasized the 
link between disarmament and development, while the Western states emphasized 
security first and development second. Western states tended to be “particularly averse to 
any concessions, whereas NAM states tended to be particularly averse to the lack of 
progress in the development context” (p. 122). As previously discussed, this schism in 
perspective led to both coalitions leveraging the threat of vetoing power in order to gain 
more concessions. Alongside this issue, there was a held belief that the NAM states had 
already conceded too much in the CWC with the exportation and development sections of 
this treaty. In turn, the BWC protocol negotiations were a platform for NAM states to 
hold their position, and increase their gains. In conclusion, anchoring, loss aversion, 
groupthink, and framing all impacted the failure of these negotiations.  
 The protocol negotiations might have just not been important enough of a 
problem to the state parties to come to a deal. Zartman identifies two concepts that may 
be relevant to this idea: mutually enticing opportunity, and mutually hurting stalemate 
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(Zartman, 2000). In the context of the BWC negotiations, Zartman would say that since 
biological weapons were not incredibly problematic during the 1990’s, the United States’ 
choice in rejecting these protocols would not mutually hurt most state parties 
(Littlewood, 2012; Zartman, 2000). Furthermore, as previously discussed, unlike the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review in 1995, there were no impacts on the BWC if 
the Ad Hoc group failed to agree, and moreover, this treaty—though toothless—had been 
without these protocols for sixteen years. Since the issue of a protocol was not entirely 
pressing for the BWC, these factors likely played a role in some state parties efforts to 
derail the final draft in an attempt to gain more concessions. We also need to keep in 
mind the fact that state parties were seen to the international community as at the highest 
risk of proliferating, and using biological weapons at the time. The anthrax attacks of 
2001 in the United States occurred after these negotiations had ended. Furthermore, the 
United States, who already had external deals with Russia, and the United Kingdom, and 
with the Iraqi biological weapons program being addressed by the UN, this complex deal 
might not have seemed necessary after the years spent trying to achieve the marathon that 
is multilateral arms control negotiations.   
 The timing factor of these protocol negotiations impacted the way the 
negotiations turned out (Littlewood, 2012). In Geneva, there was a sense of lost 
momentum and missed historical opportunities for this protocol to be negotiated. A 
strong complaint from some of the State Parties was that some members could not be 
bothered to find the time for this protocol negotiation, which was destructive because of 
extensive amount of time and effort it takes to complete a multilateral treaty (Boyer, 
2012). The fact that major arms control issues were not a major agenda item for the 
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international community during the mid-1990’s supports this lack of passion for the 
protocol negotiations. External parties—like pharmaceutical companies, and other 
stakeholders—also played a role by dragging negotiations out by attempting to derail 
certain measures in the mandate. Possibly the time frame did impact these negotiations. 
History supports the idea that the early 1990’s was the time that arms control negotiation 
was the most successful during this decade. 
Parties that were not at the negotiation table but had power over the creation of 
this protocol was the industry that would be impacted by a verification measure: 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies (Zabriske, 1998). Any laboratory that has a 
dual-use capacity (tools and instruments needed to make vaccines and perform medical 
research but also used to make biological weapons) would be subject to regulatory 
measures if on-site verification was put into place (Walker & Phillips, 1998). Companies 
like Merck, and Johnson & Johnson were not pleased with the idea of being further 
nationally regulated, and having the potential for expensive proprietary information be 
stolen. The pharma industry spoke expressively about the concerns of regulating 
laboratories. In turn, the industry “maintain[ed] an active dialog with…negotiators to 
keep issues of [the] greatest importance to [the] industry… [in] the deliberations” 
(Zabriskie, 1998, p. 314). More importantly, in the spring of 1998, United States officials 
met with biotechnology and pharmaceutical leaders to discuss the verification issues that 
were currently being negotiated within the Ad Hoc group (Fox, 1998). The leverage the 
private industry had over negotiating on-site verification protocols proved to be harmful 
for the Ad Hoc group. One of the United States’ reasons for ending negotiations was that 
this protocol would leave private industries at risk for trade secrets to be stolen (Fox, 
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1998; Sullivan & Gorka, 2000). Both the United Kingdom and Canada’s private 
industries had issues with on-site verification measures. The staggering difference 
between these two nations and the United States is the fact that in 1994, in an attempt to 
build confidence between the United States and Russia, Russian scientists had “several 
impromptu ‘voluntary visits’…to US pharmaceutical industry facilities [which] proved so 
intrusive and defamatory for Pfizer (New York) …” and led to this company being 
“…falsely accused of continuing biological warfare operations …” [table 13] (Fox, 1998, 
p. 506).  
 
Table 13 
Why US Private Industry Interests Push Against Onsite Verification 
Interests Issues Support 
Costs 
 
Trade Secrets 
 
Public Image  
 
Regulations 
 
 
Regulation of Labs: 
• Increases Overall Costs  
• Gives potential for trade 
secrets to be stolen  
Fear of intrusion and defamatory 
reports: 
• 1994: Russian scientist 
visits falsely accused 
Pfizer (New York) of 
continuing BW 
operations  
Multi-billion-dollar industry that 
spends millions of dollars every 
year on lobbyists 
• 2009: Pfizer spends $6.1 
million on lobbying, 
PhRMA $7 million 
 
Support from Government:    
• multi-billion dollar 
contracts for biodefense  
 
 (Fox, 1998; cbsnews.com) 
 
 
 As it stands today, the BWC continues to meet every five years for a review 
conference (unog.ch/bwc). Yet, the BWC has not entered back into negotiations to 
discuss a potential for legally/non-legally binding mandates to strengthen this treaty. The 
reason behind this stalemate is because of the conflict of on-site verification (Littlewood, 
2012).  
 Throughout the Ad Hoc Group negotiations, the United States refused to use the 
word “verification” when negotiating a possibility for on-site inspections. This word was 
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completely polarizing to the United States. In the words of Ambassador Mahley (retired), 
who headed the negotiations for the United States between 1993 to 2002, “…verification 
has a very specific meaning to the United States. It requires us to be able to determine, 
with a high degree of confidence, the existence of an illicit program prior to the time that 
it becomes a military threat. We have never thought that the BWC was capable of 
verification of that standard, so throughout the negotiations we never once referred to it 
as a verification protocol” (D. Mahley, Sept. 7, 2001). In this interview, Mahley 
continues to state that the sole reason the United States participated in these negotiations 
was to boost confidence in the BWC, not to determine legally binding on-site inspection 
measures. Russia, China, and Iran were also opposed to the verification protocols that 
were put in the final draft of the Ad Hoc Group negotiations (SJIR, 2001). Yet, 
verification continues to be an issue for the United States long after the ending 
negotiations in 2001.  
 As previously discussed, political and structural (military, resources) powers both 
affect the positions and values that each state brings to the table during negotiations. 
Even more for the BWC, though, industry has had a dramatic impact on these multilateral 
regulations. A specific example of this collusion that impacted the BWC is the case of the 
biotech and pharmaceutical companies (Zabriskie, 1998). Scientific-military literature 
explains that biotech and pharmaceutical industries have become increasingly militarized 
due to biodefense research (Winzoski, 2007). Project BioShield is just one biodefense 
venture that has $5.6 billion in contracts for these industries (fas.org). Interest-based 
theories explain that these industries acted in the most predictable way possible when 
they were faced with the BWC negotiations of the 1990’s: they used power to avoid the 
 46 
financial strain from the potential increase in regulation/law on laboratories, which in 
turn maximized profit (Winzoski, 2007). More importantly, the 1994 inspections of 
Pfizer’s labs left this industry in fear of defamation and embarrassment not just for them, 
but for the United States. Historically, this paper has discussed the issues that arise when 
nations are publically accused of biological warfare, (in the example of the United States 
and Russia during World War II).  
 Interest-based theories not only explain why the biotech and pharmaceutical 
industries pushed the United States to withdraw from verification protocols, but it also 
explains why, to this day, the BWC still does not have legally binding mandates. Political 
powers have shifted in State Party nations over this time alongside international concerns. 
One thing that prevails, though, is the influence of industry on treaty creation. Like 
George W. Bush, the Obama administration still refuses to continue negotiations in lieu 
of a legally binding on-site verification measures. During every conference since the 
conclusion of negotiations in 2001, state parties have tried to persuade the United States 
to renegotiate on-site inspections, which is always rejected. This attempt at persuasion 
might be noble, but in reality it only continues to stall future mandates that could 
potentially strengthen the BWC. Moreover, this tactic focuses all efforts into a 
verification protocol, which leaves no room for idea creation. The negotiation position of 
the United States is to avoid the conflict of on-site inspections but not leave the 
negotiation table. In turn, this tactic stalls negotiations on other strengthening measures 
indefinitely.  
 Interest-based theories predict what the outcome of the next conference will be for 
the BWC in 2016, but it does not give the international community a solution when faced 
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with a toothless treaty. In my opinion, the best tactic for the BWC is to take verification 
off the table, so that the United States will be willing to negotiate other mandates for this 
treaty.  
 With verification off the table for the BWC, there is potential to strengthen this 
treaty and open up dialogue for other kinds of mandates. I suggest the BWC focus on two 
facets for future growth: first, resolving issues the BWC faced during the Ad Hoc 
negotiations and second, focusing on current literature that proposes alternatives to on-
site verification.  
 By resolving some of the issues that burdened the State-Parties during the Ad Hoc 
Group negotiations, the BWC can prevent the same issues from occurring in future 
negotiations. As previously discussed, support staff is necessary for a multilateral 
negotiation of this treaty’s size (Boyer, 2012). Responding to this criticism, the BWC did 
create the Implementation Support Unit in 2006 (unog.ch/bwc). Funded by the BWC, this 
support staff is small, consisting of three full-time support staff. Though it may help, I do 
not believe that the size of a staff unit completely determines the overall of support a 
multilateral treaty has. In contrast to the size of the support staff, the skills the staff 
possess in areas, including facilitation, are of paramount importance (Albin, 2012). 
Therefore, I suggest that the BWC continue to asses if the current ISU is accomplishing 
this task.  
A major issue the Ad Hoc Group faced was the breakdown of trust between the 
state parties. One way of diminishing distrust in the international community is to create 
norms of behavior (Croft, 1996). Historically, these norms are agreed upon during 
multilateral disarmament treaties, like the BWC, and pertain to definitions of uncivilized 
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means of warfare, conduct, etc. The issue with international norms is that they are 
frequently broken and lead to further distrust between nations (Croft, 1996). Richard 
Shell points out three factors when it comes to reciprocity in negotiations: trustworthiness 
with yourself, fairness to people who are fair to you, and unfair treatment left unsaid 
leads to exploitation (Shell, 2006, p. 66).  These three factors are important in multilateral 
negotiations because reciprocity can establish, and repair trust between nations. In the 
future, negotiations for the BWC should concentrate on establishing a norm of 
reciprocity. 
The issue of trust can also be addressed in the implementation of future mandates 
for the BWC, which should include increased confidence-building measures. Confidence-
building measures have been in place for the BWC since 1986. These measures “are the 
only formal politically binding mechanism for increasing transparency and demonstrating 
compliance with the treaty” (Koblentz & Chevrier, 201, p. 233). Though these measures 
need to be strengthened, they are an established norm for this treaty, and therefore, can 
act as a structure for future mandates. Since the CBM’s were created in 1986, the use of 
biological and toxin weapons has shifted from state-parties to non-state parties and 
“warfare, itself, may be outmoded since it is an exercise in which the benefit to cost ratio 
is unsatisfactory” (Hilleman, 2002, p. 3064; Koblentz & Chevrier, 2011). Furthermore, 
with the advancement of science and technology, the international community is more 
aware of the wide reaching impacts of biological weapon use (not unlike the idea of 
mutual assured destruction). In conclusion, the BWC would be strengthened by focusing 
efforts on increasing the security of exports, focusing outwardly on non-state party 
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violence, and ensuring the security of laboratories with dual-use instruments and 
pathogens non-state parties might attempt to steal.  
One issue that should be addressed is the implementation of new mandates. State 
Parties will need to find the means to fund new mandates. This financial stress will not be 
equitable between State Parties because of the disparity of wealth across the globe. This 
factor may create further power imbalances between the State Parties. Yet, wealth is not 
the only important factor in a multilateral treaty though. A willingness to participate in 
information gathering and dialogue is critical to strengthening multilateral negotiations.  
 Improvising the CBMs to include a broader approach to security is just one way 
the BWC can be strengthened. Some other mandates include the increased support of 
health organizations (like the WHO) to support nations that lack stockpiles of vaccines 
and the fiscal means to create national containment and relief measures for biological 
attacks (Hilleman, 2002). The purpose of this paper, though, is to not discuss every 
mandate that could strengthen the BWC but to argue the fact that taking the debated 
verification protocol off the table for now, could open up the door for these mandates to 
exist.  
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 The complexity of multilateral disarmament treaties is evident in the case of the 
BWC. In the past, the BWC has been criticized for being a weak document pertaining to 
the efforts to stop the proliferation, stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin weapons. 
This weakness is further supported by the fact that the State Parties of this treaty cannot 
agree to even negotiate future mandates to strengthen the BWC. By analyzing the parties 
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involved in the negotiations of the 1990’s, including the interests of the pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology industry, it is easier to understand why negotiations failed by 2001 and 
why future mandates have been stalled.  
In lieu of paper tigers, tabling a verification protocol will enable the State Parties 
of this treaty to finally get back to the negotiation table. In turn, this act of good faith will 
give the international community a sense of security as mandates for protection against 
biological and toxin warfare are implemented.  
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